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CHAPTER 2 
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS 
OF WAR 
2oo WAR AND LAW 
Although the resort to war is generally prohibited by the Charter of the 
United Nations, it is exceptionally permitted as an enforcement measure 
taken by or on behalf of the United Nations and as a measure of individual 
or collective self-defense against at;t armed attack. However, the dis-
tinction must be made between the resort to war and the conduct of war. 
Whether the resort to war is lawful or unlawful the conduct of war is 
regulated by the system of rules known as the lavvs (or rules) of war. 
These rules regulate the conduct of war on land, at sea, and in the air. 
The laws of \var are designed to control and mitigate the harmful effects of 
war by extending, during time of war, at least a minimum standard of 
protection to combatants and noncombatants and to all individuals who 
come under the control of the belligerents. These laws are also helpful in 
regulating the transition to peace at the conclusion of active hostilities. 
The laws of war are effective to the extent that they are obeyed by the 
belligerents. 1 
210 THE SOURCES OF THE LAWS REGULATING WARFARE 2 
The principal sources of the laws of war are custom and treaties. 
211 CUSTOMARY LAW 
Customary laws of war develop out of the usage or practice of states 
when such usage or practice attains a degree of regularity and is accom-
panied by the general conviction that behavior in conformity vvith this 
usage or practice is both obligatory and right. 3 In a period marked by 
frequent resort to armed conflict, customary law may develop within a 
short time. 4 
2.12 TREATIES 
Treaties, or conventions as they are somettmes called, are international 
agreements between two or more states. Certain conventions represent a 
codification of the rules of war already established by custom. There are 
also conventions by which new laws of war are created. Both types of 
conventions have provided the more important developments in the rules 
of war. 5 
(Footnotes at end of chapter) 
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213 BINDING FORCE OF RULES REGULATING WARFARE 
a. CusToMARY RULES oF wAR are binding on all belligerents and under 
all conditiohs. 6 Special rules apply in cases of reprisals against a belligerent 
for illegitimate acts of warfare. (See Section 3 10.) 
b. RuLES EsTABLISHED BY TREATIES. Rules established through a con-
vention (treaty) are usually binding only between parties which have 
ratified or adhered to, and have not thereafter denounced or withdrawn 
from, the convention. Furthermore, the rules established through a con-
vention are binding only to the extent permitted by the terms of the con-
vention or by the reservations, if any, that have accompanied the ratifica-
tion of or adherence to the convention. However, even when the above 
requirements are not met, a convention may represent, or come to represent, 
a general consensus as to the established law. Hence, the widespread 
observance of these conventional rules frequently renders them enforceable 
as law regardless of ratification. 7 As occasions arise, it is the responsi-
bility of higher authority to determine and instruct forces afloat as to which, 
if any, of these conventions are not legally binding between the United 
States and other states immediately concerned, and as to which, if any, are 
for that reason not to be observed or enforced for the titne being. 
220 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR 
Among the customary rules of warfare there are three rules frequently 
referred to as the" basic principles of the laws of war": military necessity, 
humanity, and chivalry. 8 These rules, or basic princi pies, are defined as 
follOW'"S: 
a. MILITARY NEcESSITY. The principle of military necessity 9 pennits a 
belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not other-
wise prohibited by the laws of war, 10 required for the partial or complete 
submission of the ene1ny with the least possible expenditure of time, life, 
and physical resources. 
b. HuMANITY. The principle of humanity prohibits the employment of 
any kind or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of the war, i. e., 
for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.n 
c. CHIVALRY. The principle of chivalry forbids the resort to dishonorable 
(treacherous) means, expedients, or conduct. (See Section 64o.) 
2.2.1 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NONCOM-
BATANTS 
a. DisTINCTION. The traditional laws of war are based largely on the 
distinction made between combatants and concombatants. In accordance 
with this distinction, the population of a belligerent is divided into tw·o 
general classes: the armed forces (combatants) and the civilian population 
(noncotnbatants). 12 Each class has specific duties and rights in time of 
war, and no person can belong to both classes at the sa1ne time. 
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b. RESTRICTION OF HOSTILITIES. UnJer CUStOtnary international law in-
dividuals who do not fotm a part of the armed forces and who refrain from 
the con1mission of all acts of hostility must be safeguarded against injury 
not incidental to military operations directed against combatant forces and 
other military objectives.l3 In particular, it is forbidden to 1nake con-
combatants the object of a direct attack by the armed forces of a belligerent, 
if such attack is unrelated to a military objective.14 Attack for the sole 
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population is also forbidden. 15 
2.30 NEUTRALITY 
a. DEFINITION. Neutrality may be defined as the nonparticipation of a 
state in a war between other states. Such nonparticipation must in turn 
be recognized by the belligerents. In the absence of any treaty limiting 
the available scope of neutrality (see Article 2.32.), whether or not a state 
chooses to refrain from participating in war is a policy decision. Simi-
larly, recognition of such nonparticipation is also a policy decision. 
b. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS. Under general international law a neutral 
state has certain obligations and rights toward belligerents, and bel-
ligerents have corresponding rights and obligations toward a neutral (see 
Section 440). The principle of impartiality holds that a neutral state is 
required to fulfill its obligations and enforce its rights in an equal manner 
toward all belligerents. H a neutral state does not observe the principle 
of impartiality the belligerent injured by such nonobservance may consider 
itself to be bound no longer by its obligations toward the neutral. 16 
2.31 THE DETERMINATION OF NEUTRAL STATUS OF STATES 
Although it is usual, on the outbreak of war, for nonparticipating states 
to issue proclamations of neutrality, a special declaration by nonpartici-
pating states of their intention to adopt a neutral status is not required. 17 
The status of neutrality is terminated only when a neutral state resorts to 
war against a belligerent or when a belligerent resorts to war against a 
neutral. 18 
2.32. NEUTRALITY UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 
The Charter of the United Nations imposes upon the member states the 
obligations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to 
refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations. The 
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force is modified by the right 
of individual and collective self-defense to be exercised in case of an armed 
attack until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to restore 
peace and by the obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council. In case of a threat to or breach of the peace, the Security Council 
is authorized to take enforcement action, involving or not involving the 
use·of armed force, in order to maintain or restore peace. The member 
states are obligated to give the United Nations every assistance 1n any 
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action it takes and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against 
which the ·united Nations is taking action. Consequently, the members 
of the United Nations may be obliged to give assistance with their armed 
forces to the United Nations in its enforcement actions, the fulfillment of 
which obligation is incompatible with the status of neutrality. On the 
other hand, n1ember states may be obliged to give assistance to the United 
Nations in its enforcement actions only with measures not involving the 
use of armed force. In this case, they may remain neutral, since they are 
not obliged to participate in the hostilities, although they are obliged not 
to observe an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents. These 
obligations of the member states, incompatible with the status of neutrality 
and with the principle of impartiality, come into existence only if the 
Security Council fulfills the functions delegated to it by the Charter. H 
the Security Council is unable to fulfill its assigned functions, the members 
may, in case of a war, remain neutral and observe an attitude of strict 
impartiali ty. 19 
2.33 NEUTRALITY UNDER REGIONAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-
DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS 
The right of individual and collective self-defense established by the 
Charter of the United Nations may be implemented by regional and col-
lective self-defense arrangetnents. Under these arrangements the possi-
bility of maintaining a status of neutrality and of observing an attitude of 
impartiality depends upon the extent to which the contracting parties are 
obliged to give assistance to the regional action, or in the case of collective 
self-defense, to the victim of an armed attack. 20 
2.40 THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE 
Naval forces operating on land will be governed by the laws and customs 
of war on land. 21 
2.50 THE LAWS OF AIR WARFARE 
There is no co1nprehensive body of laws specially applicable to air war-
fare in the same sense that there is a comprehensive body of specialized laws 
relating only to sea warfare and· a similar body of laws relating only to 
land warfare. 22 There are, however, certain custotnary and conventional 
rules of a general character underlying the conduct of war on land and at 
sea which must be considered equally binding in air warfare. 23 In addition, 
there are certain specialized laws of sea and land warfare which ·may be 
considered applicable to air warfare as well. 24 
This book applies to the whole of naval warfare and thereby includes 
naval air warfare. Appropriate note is taken throughout this book of the 
situations in which the specialized rules of naval warfare do not similarly 
regulate the conduct of naval air warfare. In the absence of these distinc-
tions, operational naval commanders are to assume that the rules regulating 
warfare at sea are equally applicable to naval air warfare. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 
1 This statement does not refer to occasional violations of the rules of warfare . Such occa-
sional violations do not substantially affect the validity of the law. However, the continuous 
violation of certain rules of warfare is a different matter, especially when such violations are 
not answered by protests and reprisals on the part of the belligerent against whom they are 
taken. Hence, reference is made here to this question: When do rules of warfare, either custo-
mary or conventional, cease to be valid for the reason that over a period of time they are neither 
obeyed nor applied by belligerents? 
The experience of World War II, and of the war crimes trials. which followed, seems to 
indicate quite clearly that the present principal area of uncertainty in the rules of war is that 
relating to the permissible methods and weapons for the conduct of actual military operations 
against members of the armed forces and the civilians who suffer as a result of such operations. 
2 Section 2.10 is limited to a consideration of the international regulation of warfare, and does 
not cover national regulation by the United States, which is dealt with in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and U. S. Navy Regulations. 
3 It is necessary to distinguish clearly between the usages of warfare (manner of warfare) 
and the customs of warfare. The development from usage to custom is a decisive one since, 
in a strict sense, it is only after a usage or practice has developed into a custom-i. e. only 
after a certain behavior is generally considered as both obligatory and right-that we are 
entitled to speak of legal rules of warfare. 
In recent years there has been a marked tendency to include among the sources of the rules 
of war certain principles of law adopted by many states in their domestic legislation. In the 
judgment rendered in The Hostages Case the United States Military Tribunal stated: 
"The tendency has been to apply the term "customs and practices accepted by civilized 
nations generally," as it is used in International Law, to the laws of war only. But the 
principle has no such restricted meaning. It applies as well to fundamental principles of 
justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilized nations generally. In determining 
whether such a fundamental rule of justice is entitled to be declared a principle of international 
law, an examination of the municipal laws of states in the family of nations will reveal the 
answer. If it is found to have been accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by 
most nations in their municipal law, its declaration as a rule of international law would 
seem to be fully justified." (United States v. List et al.) Trials of War Criminals, Vol. 
XI (195o), p. 12.35. 
4 It is frequently difficult to determine the point in time at which a usage of war has devel-
oped into a customary rule. In addition, it has been a characteristic feature of the customary 
law of war that there have been numerous controversies between states over the precise content 
of these rules once their existence as law has been definitely established. These difficulties, 
among others, have led in the past to increased effort toward the codification of the law of war 
through written conventions (treaties). 
5 The most recently concluded international conventions relating to the regulation of the 
conduct of warfare are the 1949 Geneva Conventions For the Protection of War Victims. 
6 See Note 10 below for a discussion of the effect of the principle of military necessity upon 
the binding force of customary laws of war. 
7 Numerous multilateral agreements contain a ptovision similar to that contained in Article 
2.8 of Hague Convention No. XIII (1907 ); namely, that "The provisions of the present convention 
do not apply except to the contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties 
to the convention." The effects of this so called "general participation" clause have not been 
as far-reaching as might be supposed. In World Wars I and II belligerents frequently affirmed 
their intention to be bound by agreements containing the general participation clause regardless 
of whether or not the strict requirements of the clause were actually met. Furthermore, certain 
conv~ntions have been generally regarded either as a codification of preexisting customary law 
or as having come to represent, through widespread observance, rules of law binding upon all 
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states. Both the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and For the Far East treated 
the general participation clause in Hague Convention No. IV (1907 ), Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, as irrelevant. They also declared that the general principles laid 
down in the 192.9 Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention, which does not contain a general 
participation clause, were binding on signatories and non-signatories alike. Article 2., para-
graph 3, of all four 1949 Geneva Conventions states: 
"Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the 
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They 
shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter 
accepts and applies the provisions thereof.'' 
8 The confusion surrounding the principles of military necessity and of humanity is due 
largely to the fact that they have been used in two distinctly different senses. There has been 
a failure to clarify these two meanings. They may be, and often are, referred to as principles 
or ideals which, though not possessing the status of law, have been significant in their influence 
upon the course of development of the law of war. On the other hand, the principles of 
military necessity and of humanity also form a part of the positive law of war. This is the 
second sense in which they may be used, and it is in this sense that these principles are referred 
to in Section 2.2.0. 
9 An excellent definition of the principle of military necessity is found in the following 
quotation: 
''Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifying the killing of innocent 
members of the population and the destruction of villages and towns in the occupied territory. 
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount 
and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of time, life and money. In general, it sanctions measures by an occupant 
necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his opera-
tions. It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose 
destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows 
the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not per-
mit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction 
of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of inter-
national law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property 
and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is lawful to destroy railways, lines of communi-
cation, or any other property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and 
churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit 
the wanton devastation of a district or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants 
for the sake of suffering alone.'' 
The Hostages Case (United States v. List et al.), Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XI (1950), 
p. 1253-4· 
10 The customary rule of military necessity may be, and in many instances is, restricted in 
its application to the conduct of war by other customary or conventional rules. The opinion 
that all rules of war are subject to, and restricted by, the operation of the principle of military 
necessity has never been accepted by the majority of American and English authorities. Fur-
thermore, this opinion has not been accepted by military tribunals. It has been held by military 
tribunals that the plea of military necessity cannot be considered as a defense for the violations 
of rules which lay down absolute prohibitions (e. g., the rule prohibiting the killing of prisoners 
of war) and which provide no exception for those circumstances cons.tituting military necessity. 
Thus, one United States Military Tribunal, in rejecting the argument that the rules of war are 
always subject to the operation of military necessity, stated: 
"It is an essence of war that one or the other side must lose and the experienced generals 
and statesmen knew this when they drafted the rules and customs of land warf~re. In short 
these rules and customs of warfare are designed specifically for all phases of ·war. They 
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comprise the law for such emergency. To claim that they can be wantonly-and at the sole 
discretion of any one belligerent-disregarded when he considers his ov.rn situation to be 
critical, means nothing more or less than to abrogate the law~ 2-nd custom5 of war entirely." 
The Krupp Trial (Trial of Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp Von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others) , 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. X (1949), p. I39· 
However, there are rules of customary and conventional law which normally prohibit certain 
acts but which exceptionally allow a belligerent to commit these normally prohibited acts in 
circumstances of military necessity. In conventional rules the precise formulation given to 
this exception varies. Some rules contain the clause that they shall be observed "as far as 
military necessity (military interests) permits." Other rules permit acts normally forbidden 
if "required" or "demanded" by the necessities of war. Rules providing for the exceptional 
operation of military necessity require a careful consideration of the relevant circumstances to 
determine whether or not the performance of normally prohibited acts is rendered necessary 
in order to protect the safety of a belligerent's forces or to facilit ate the success of its military 
operations. 
11 The opinion is occasionally expressed that these two principles, necessity and humanity, 
contradict one another in the sense that they serve opposed ends. This is not the case. In 
allowing only that use of force necessary for the purpose of war, the principle of necessity 
implies the principle of humanity which disallows any kind or degree of force not essential for 
the realization of this purpose; that is, force which needlessly or unnecessarily causes or aggra-
vates both human suffering and physical destruction. Thus, the two principles may properly 
be described, not as opposing, but as complementing each other. The real difficulty arises, not 
from the actual meaning of the principles, but from their application in practice. 
12The terms "civilian population" and "noncombatants" are used interchangeably in 
Article 2.2.1, and refer to those peaceful inhabitants of a state who neither are attached to, nor 
accompany, the armed forces. 
It should be observed that the term "noncombatants" also has a more restricted meaning 
and refers to certain categories of individuals who are attached to or accompany the armed 
forces of a belligerent, e. g., hospital personnel, chaplains, correspondents, etc. The status of 
these noncombatant categories is dealt with in the detailed provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention for the Protection of Victims of War. 
13 In land warfare the noncombatant population must not, as a rule, be deprived of their 
private property except with payment therefor when such property must be requisitioned 
because of military necessity. However, in naval warfare the private property of the enemy 
population, as a rule may be seized and condemned in a court of prize. There are certain minor 
exceptions to this general right of seizure of private property at sea, e. g., small coastal (not 
deep sea) fishing vessels may only be seized under conditions of military necessity. 
14 Recent developments in the methods and weapons of warfare have decidedly affected this 
once fundamental distinction between combatants and noncombatants. These developments 
have been summarized as follows: growth of the number of combatants; growth of numbers 
of noncombatants engaged in war preparations; the development of aerial warfare; economic 
measures; and the advent of totalitarian states. (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, 
Vol. II (7th ed., 1952.), pp. 2.07-8). To the foregoing should be added the development of 
guided missiles and atomic and thermonuclear weapons. 
The restriction of hostilities to the armed forces of a belligerent is therefore now valid subject 
only to far-reaching qualifications, particularly with respect to the conduct of aerial warfare 
(see also paragraph 503b for changes in naval wnfare which presently affect the distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants). It should be pointed out, however, that the partial 
breakdown of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants applies mainly to the 
actual conduct of hostilities. The distinction remains quite effective insofar as it applies not 
to the conduct of hostilities but to the treatment of the victims of w<:~r who fall under the con-
trol of an enemy belligerent. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have further clarified this dis· 
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tinction as it applies to the victims of war in the conventions dealing with the treatment of 
prisoners of war and with the protection of civilian persons in time of war. 
15 It should be emphasized that despite recent developments in the conduct of warfare, dis-
cussed above, the prohibitions against subjecting noncombatants to direct attack unrelated 
to a military objective or of attacking them for: the purpose of terrorization remain valid. 
16 A state may be neutral, insofar as it does not participate in hostilities, even though it 
may be not impartial. Whether or not the successful maintenance of a position of non participa-
tion is possible, in the absence of complete impartiality, is quite another question. 
17 Article 2. of Hague Convention No. III (1907) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities obli-
gates belligerents to inform neutrals of the existence of a state of war. 
"Article 2.. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without 
delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, 
which may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on 
the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the 
existence of a state of war." 
The above Article is binding between a belligerent state which is a party to Hague Conven-
tion No. III (1907) and neutral states which also are parties to the Convention. 
18 When the United States is a belligerent, the designation of neutral status of third states 
will be promulgated by Department of the Navy directives. 
19 In the absence of a Security Council decision, states may discriminate, and even resort to 
war, against a state they deem guilty of an illegal armed attack. This follows from Article 5 I 
of the Charter which stipulates the ''right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations ... " (It should also be noted that 
under the resolution "Uniting For Peace" the General Assembly of the United Nations may, 
in the event of a breach of the peace, make "appropriate recommendations to members for 
collective measures, including ... the use of armed force when necessary ... " However~ at 
present these recommendations of the General Assembly do not constitute legal obligations 
for the member states.) In sum, then, although members may discriminate against an aggressor, 
even in the absence of any action on the part of the Security Council, they do not have the duty 
to do so. In these circumstances neutrality and complete impartiality both remain distinct 
possibilities. 
2° The principal effect of regional and collective self-defense arrangements is to transform 
the right of the parties to assist that state suffering from an armed attack into a duty to assist 
a state attacked. This duty may assume various forms, ranging from economic assistance to 
the undertaking of measures of armed force on behalf of the state attacked. Article 2. of the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty • 
both obligate the contracting states, including the United States, to consider an armed attack 
against any contracting party as an armed attack against all of the contracting parties and to 
take any and all such measures as each state may consider necessary to assist the state so 
attacked. 
21 A compilation of the rules of land warfare is contained in Law of Land Warfare, FM 2.7-10 
(1956), issued by the Department of the Army, and in supplements thereto. 
22 The few provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 pertaining to the conduct 
of aerial warfare are generally recognized as no longer valid. The Rules of Aerial Warfare of 
February 19, 192.3, drafted by the Commission of Jurists at The Hague, were never ratified by 
any of the participating states. 
23 An example of a customary rule of war applicable to aerial warfare is the prohibition 
against "wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity." (See subparagraph 32.obC6) and Article 62.1). Equally applicable is the customary 
rule forbidding the denial of quarter unless bad faith is suspected; though, given the peculiar 
conditions of aerial warfare, this rule is frequently difficult to carry out in practice. The rele-
vant Geneva Conventions of 1949, governing the treatment of the sick and wounded and of 
prisoners of war, are conventional rules of a general character applicable to air warfare. 
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24 Caution must be exercised in indiscriminately attempting to apply " by analogy" these 
specialized rules of land warfare to air warfare. The peculiar conditions of aerial warfare have 
occasioned practices unique to this form of warfare. Consequently, the attempt to apply 
"by analogy" the specialized rules of land and sea warfare to air warfare may lead frequently 
to a disregard of these practices and to this extent be quite misleading. For example, the dis-
tinctions made between legitimate ruses and forbidden perfidy are different in land and in naval 
warfare. Yet neither the distinctions made in land warfare nor the distinctions made in naval 
warfare have been in accordance with the practices of air warfare. 
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